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Tables 
Table 1 
Distribution of Deep-Sea Trawlers, 1951 





(140’ and over) 
Total 
North Shields 41 41 
Hartlepool 6 6 
Scarborough 3 3 
Hull 4 163 167 
Grimsby 139 6 91 236 
Lowestoft 120 120 
Yarmouth 10 10 
Ramsgate 2 2 
Poole 1 1 
Brixham 8 8 
Newlyn 5 5 
Plymouth 4 4 
Cardiff 2 8 10 
Swansea 7 3 3 13 
Milford Haven 71 9 8 88 
Fleetwood 80 22 23 125 
Aberdeen 199 11 3 213 
Montrose 3 3 
Leith 39 14 1 54 
740 77 292 1,109 
Source: White Fish Authority, First Annual Report and Accounts for the period ended 31
st
 March 
1952.  London: White Fish Authority, 1952, 24. 
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Table 2 








Percentage of Vessels in each class of ownership 
Total Hull Grimsby Aberdeen Fleetwood Milford 
Haven 
Under 5 206 352 28 11 25 41 31 56 
5 to 9 39 240 19 15 17 28 20 13 
10 to 19 26 326 25 22 25 22 36 31 
Over 19 12 362 28 52 33 9 13 0 
Totals 283 1,280 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Great Britain, Sea Fish Commission, Second Report: The White Fish Industry.  London: HMSO, 
1936, 20. 
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Table 3 
Average Net Profit of Trawlers at Selected Ports, 1946-9, in Pence per Stone (14lb) 
1946/7 1947/8 1948/9 
Distant Water 
Hull 23.03 17.68 12.46 
Grimsby 18.74 12.38 9.05 
Near and Middle Water 
Grimsby (middle water) 5.13 4.11 -3.30
Grimsby (near water) 2.90 -8.01 -4.22
Fleetwood 10.66 9.54 6.61 
North Shields 14.30 7.37 -4.85
Aberdeen 11.29 -6.57 -10.96
Milford Haven 6.75 -2.65 -7.00
Swansea 9.59 1.84 -10.17
Source: TNA, MAF 209/751.  White Fish Industry: Short Term Remedies.  Report of Official 
Committee. 
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‘To Save the Industry from Complete Ruin’:
1
 Crisis and Response in British Fishing 1945-1951 
Abstract 
Fishing is a small, complex and fragmented industry, which arguably exerts political significance 
disproportionate to its size.  This article traces the prolonged period of depression which affected 
British deep-sea fishing between the wars, and then a more virulent crisis which erupted in the post-
war years.  It explores how the industry proved unable to respond effectively, requiring intervention 
from government which followed a similar pattern to that elsewhere in the economy, albeit tailored 
to the industry’s peculiar circumstances and idiosyncratic nature. 
Keywords 
Fisheries, Labour, productivity, crisis, reorganisation, industrial policy 
Fishing is an idiosyncratic industry. It is the only primary producer that involves harvesting wild 
creatures.  Defined broadly to ncompass marketing and distribution, as it is here, it also contains 
elements of secondary processing, and tertiary marketing and sales.  It is thus a complex and 
multifaceted business, and geographically highly dispersed one, with units scattered around much of 
the country.  It is also a small one, which in part is why it has received relatively little attention from 
economic and business historians, and even some maritime historians have tended to overlook it, or 
to treat it as unimportant.  Studies of its twentieth-century history tend to focus either on the labour 
history of the catching sector or on the science and politics of overfishing and attempts to 
ameliorate it, telling a familiar story of increasingly circumscribed access to fishing grounds leading 
to the collapse of the distant-water sector in the 1970s.
2
  This leaves important areas unexplored, 
including many key aspects of the business history of the industry.  Among these is the crisis which 
enveloped the deep-sea fishing industry in the years after World War II, a crisis which came close to 
forcing the lay-up of most of the trawler fleet and cutting off much of the nation’s fish supply almost 
overnight.  Despite its seriousness, and despite the fact that government responded by putting in 
place two key planks of fisheries policy which remain in place, the crisis is virtually unknown.  It is 
not mentioned even in the most comprehensive history of the deep-sea fisheries,
3
 and even some 
major participants in the industry in the ensuing years are only dimly aware of it.
4
   
This article examines the causes, course and effects of that crisis.  It first provides an outline 
of the deep-sea fishing industry between the wars, and explains how the post-war crisis was rooted 
in problems that had begun to emerge during the 1920s.  It also highlights, by way of background, 
some of the responses on the part of industry and government during the 1930s, arguing that the 
industry was too fragmented to address its structural weaknesses and required intervention from 
outside, although this was fairly limited.  It then moves on to trace the debates over intervention 
which resurfaced in the years after World War II, before examining the renewed and much more 
serious crisis which engulfed the industry in 1949, the renewed inability of much of the industry to 
respond and the more aggressive intervention from central government.  It concludes with a brief 
outline of the legacy of those years, and of how policy initiatives taken then endure in modified form 
to the present day. 
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The Deep-Sea Fishing Industry, 1921-1945 
The British deep-sea fishing industry experienced rapid growth from the 1840s to the outbreak of 
World War I.  Between the wars, and after, it consisted of three sectors, defined by the size of the 
trawlers (which by then they all were, long-lining being largely defunct) used and the grounds they 
fished.  Deep-sea fishing vessels were defined officially as those over 70’ in length.  Within this, 
vessels of 70-129’ were termed ‘near water,’ and fished primarily for cod, haddock and other 
demersal fish in the North Sea, English Channel, Western Approaches and Irish Sea.  Most were 
steam trawlers, although a dwindling number of sailing ‘smacks’ continued to trawl for high-value 
species, especially soles, from Lowestoft and Brixham until 1939, whilst internal combustion engines 
began to come into use during the 1930s.
5
  ‘Middle water’ trawlers of 130-139’ fished around the 
Faroe Islands, Rockall, the northern North Sea, and in summer off southern Iceland.  ‘Distant water’ 
trawlers of over 140’ fished Icelandic grounds, catching mainly cod and haddock, and from the 1920s 
the North Cape of Norway, Bear Island, Spitsbergen, the Barents Sea and the coasts of Greenland 
and Newfoundland.
6
  The distribution of these vessels by port is given in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
These figures pertain to 1951, as similar figures for the interwar period are unavailable.  However, 
the distribution of the fleet was roughly similar, although the total number of vessels was greater.
7
   
 Many of the sailing smacks which dominated the industry until the 1880s had been owned 
by their skippers, and a few owner-skippers remained in the inter-war period, operating usually 
elderly near-water steam trawlers at Milford Haven and Aberdeen, and sailing trawlers at Lowestoft 
and Brixham.
8
  The majority of vessels were owned by limited companies, but most of these were 
small concerns, as Table 2 indicates. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Small the trawler firms may have been, but they were still much larger than most of the firms on the 
distributive side of the industry, where the majority of wholesalers both at the ports and the inland 
markets were very small concerns.  In 1934, the average Grimsby wholesale merchant handled just 
4,666cwt of fish, worth only £5,500.  Many were one-man businesses, often financially precarious 
and short-lived.
9
  Most processing firms, too, were small-scale operations, frequently 
undercapitalised and operating from cramped and insanitary premises.
10
    The supply chain as a 




The Fish Distribution Chain 
 
[figure 1 here] 
 
 
Fish therefore could pass through the hands of four or more concerns, acquiring a mark-up at every 
stage, until by the time it reached the consumer its price was nearly double that which the 
wholesale merchant had paid to the trawler owner, whilst it was often none too fresh.
11
 
Page 6 of 29






























































For Peer Review Only
 Not only was the industry as a whole fragmented, but it was also fractious.  As Lowestoft MP 
Edward Evans noted in 1950, it was ‘one of the least integrated of industries,’
12
 in which ports 
jockeyed for position against one another, the three parts of the catching sector had differing 
priorities and problems, and the interests of catchers, wholesalers, retailers and processors diverged 
sharply and sometimes acrimoniously.  This made it difficult for the industry to represent its 
collective interests to government and to powerful bodies such as the railway companies, upon 
which it depended for most long-distance transport.
13
  It also ensured that ‘unity of outlook and 
loyalty to an agreed course of action’ were very difficult to achieve.
14
   
 Such structural issues had mattered little in the years of steady growth before 1914, but 
became serious during the interwar period.  Wages and costs had been driven up during World War I 
and fell but slowly afterwards, whereas fish prices peaked in 1919, and then entered a declining 
trend which lasted almost until the end of the 1930s.
15
  This squeezed profits at all levels of the 
industry.  Small and undercapitalised near- and middle-water trawler firms were unable to invest in 
new vessels, so the fleet became increasingly elderly.  By 1934, 88 per cent of the fleet at the major 
ports, Hull excepted, were more than fifteen years old and a third had been built before World War 
I.
16
  Many of these were operating in the North Sea, in which the problem of overfishing, and 
consequent low returns to catchers, had first been highlighted in the late nineteenth century and 
was increasingly serious by the 1930s.
17
  Throughout the period, seagoing employment and the 
number of vessels fell, and the legacy of outdated and unprofitable vessels persisted until well after 
World War II. 
On the distributive side the number of wholesale merchants increased.  Wholesaling 
businesses required minimal capital to establish, and it was therefore an easy business for someone 
with some knowledge of the fish market and the ability to obtain a little credit to enter.  Many of the 
new firms were founded by former employees of established ones.  As their numbers grew, their 
average turnover fell.  By 1934 the majority of wholesalers were making profits on turnover of less 
than one per cent, and at Grimsby, in particular, the average merchant was reckoned to be 
operating at a loss.  As firms struggled to survive suspicions of sharp practice, such as the ‘topping’ 
inferior fish with a layer of high-quality fish to boost the price, and the formation of ‘rings’ to drive 
up prices, multiplied.  Such activities tarnished the reputation of the industry and its products.
18
   
 Despite these problems, national landings went up sharply because of the rapid 
development of distant-water trawling, which by 1930 had driven white fish landings to twenty-
seven per cent above their 1913 level.
19
  British fishing vessels had worked grounds around Iceland 
since the 1890s, but the interwar period saw a major move into waters further north, with a new 
generation of big trawlers, the majority owned and operated from Hull, which was exclusively a 
distant-water port after 1936, opening up grounds around Bear Island, Spitsbergen and the Barents 
Sea.
20
  Catches from these grounds were very large, and although the fish was often of indifferent 
quality, it found a ready market through the expanding fish-and-chip shop trade.  Distant-water 
fishing was therefore profitable at a time when much of the rest of the industry was struggling, and 
Hull presented ‘air of enterprise and confidence’ that contrasted sharply with the stagnation evident 
elsewhere.    The industry at Hull was able to do this because trawler firms were fewer and larger, 
and therefore better able to invest in new vessels, and, because they were all distant-water 
operators, shared the same interests and priorities.  In 1934 half of the Hull fleet was less than ten 
years old.  Wholesale merchants in Hull, too, were on average much larger and more profitable than 
at the other major ports.
21
  Trawler owners were able to introduce a voluntary scheme to prevent 
market gluts by restricting landings from northern waters in the summer months, and also a 
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minimum price agreement and a scheme whereby fish was filleted before sale and the resulting offal 
processed in a meal and oil plant owned by a consortium of vessel owners.
22
  This was not achieved 
without some friction, notably between trawler owners and wholesalers over the minimum price 
scheme, to which the latter were strongly opposed,
23
 but nevertheless Hull demonstrated the 
advantages of homogeneity and concentration, which made possible the ‘unity of outlook and 
loyalty to an agreed course of action’ so notably absent elsewhere. 
 Hull’s success, however, was alleged by others to have worsened the plight of the rest of the 
catching sector, as heavy landings from distant waters dragged down prices across the board.
24
  Hull 
owners disputed this, arguing that they served separate markets and that their catches had no effect 
on prices for higher-quality fish from the home grounds.
25
  It does seem, however, that heavy 
distant-water landings fed into the general trend of falling wholesale prices, worsened by the onset 
of the global economic depression in 1930.  By 1931 the government’s Economic Advisory 
Committee could write that: 
 
We are … confronted with a situation in which the fish which the British trawling 




The situation was exacerbated by rising imports of fresh fish.  On the recommendation of the 
Economic Advisory Committee the Sea Fishing Industry Act of 1932 restricted imports to a total of 
1¾ million hundredweight, a ten per cent reduction on the 1930-2 level.
 
That same Act empowered 
the Minister of Agriculture to impose restrictions on landings, and an Order was immediately made 
prohibiting landings from some of the distant-water grounds in the summer months, giving statutory 
force to the voluntary scheme previously agreed by Hull owners.
27
 
 Restrictions on imports, ameliorated by bilateral deals with selected countries, were in line 
with the general thrust of British government policy during the depression.
28
  The precedent they set 
was invoked repeatedly after the war when imports once again became controversial.  Typical, too, 
were other measures taken to bolster the industry.  Their problems were in some respects similar to 
those afflicting agriculture, and so were the solutions, which aimed at eliminating overcapacity, 
stabilising markets, bolstering demand and encouraging effective self-government.  Under the 
Agricultural Marketing Acts, marketing and minimum-price schemes financed by levies were set up 
by new bodies such as the Milk and Potato Marketing Boards.
29
  The first application of this thinking 
to fisheries actually addressed the herring fishing industry – not part of the deep-sea sector – for 
which the Herring Industry Board was set up in 1935 to oversee a programme of grants and loans to 
encourage investment in more efficient vessels, research and development of new catching and 
processing technologies, and improvements in marketing.
30
  The Herring Industry Board, which 
survived until 1981, set the precedent for intervention in the deep-sea fisheries, which came in the 
form of the White Fish Commission, established under the Sea Fisheries Act of 1938.
31
  It was tasked 
with conducting a comprehensive review of the industry, in the wake of which it would introduce 
regulations on handling, grading and quality control, and develop marketing schemes similar to 
those already in force for various agricultural products.
32
  It was also empowered to enforce 
registration of firms and individuals engaged in the fish trades, and to co-ordinate research and 
development work.  This was not just in line with British government policy: in many other European 
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 The White Fish Commission represented a recognition on the part of government that 
‘considerably improved organisation within the Industry ... is an indispensible condition for any 
comprehensive solution’ to its problems,
34
 and that the industry as a whole was incapable of pulling 
together to achieve this for itself.  It made an energetic start, and during 1938-9 mounted a series of 
enquiries that highlighted problems such as resentment of foreign landings, import restrictions 
notwithstanding, and rising costs, especially of the coal that fuelled most trawlers at the time.  
However, by the time it completed its first annual report the outbreak of war was imminent.  The 
report was never published, and in September 1939 the Commission was suspended and its staff 
diverted to war work.
35
  It had achieved little, but did open the way to government intervention in 
an industry traditionally hostile to interference from outside.  
 The war caused huge disruption to the fishing industry.  Many vessels were requisitioned for 
naval service, especially the largest and fastest trawlers, and most of those that remained in service 
were redirected away from the vulnerable east coast.  Hull was left with just one trawler from its 
pre-war fleet of 191 by the end of 1940, and there were none at all at Lowestoft.
36
  Landings by 
British vessels throughout the war were less than a third of their pre-war level, and imports, quotas 
on which were suspended for the duration, rose sharply to compensate.  Total imports in 1938 were 
1,123,524cwt, whereas by 1944 they stood at no less than 4,176,302cwt, of which 71 per cent came 
from Iceland.
37
  The distribution system was also reorganised.  The government’s initial plan to 
distribute fish from regional depots failed before the end of 1939, and was replaced with a new 
system whereby wholesale merchants at the ports were granted an allocation by the Ministry of 
Food.  This entailed a licensing scheme for merchants, the first time entry to the trade had been thus 
controlled, and also from 1942 the division of the country into zones, each supplied by certain ports.  
Transport arrangements were altered too, with the introduction of a flat rate of carriage to cut the 
cost of transporting fish from more remote, especially northern Scottish, ports.
38
   Fish was not 
rationed, but prices rose steadily from the summer of 1940, and reached ‘phenomenal’ levels the 
following spring, which forced the Ministry of Food to introduce price controls from June 1941.
39
  
The wartime arrangements were unpopular, because fish remained expensive and was often of poor 
quality, and because there were periodic shortages.
40
  Nevertheless, fish never disappeared from the 
shops altogether, and catchers and distributors alike made reasonable profits.  All of this served to 
mask the difficulties that had beset the fishing industry during the 1930s, which began to re-emerge 
in the post-war years. 
 
 
Reconstruction, Prosperity and Slump, 1945-50 
The Labour government that came to power in July 1945 faced unprecedented economic problems.  
To the dislocation and physical damage caused by the war were added vast debts which 
necessitated loans from America and engendered recurrent balance of payments crises, and also 
severe shortages of fuel, food and other goods.
41
  Alongside these formidable and well known 
difficulties, fishing hardly loomed large on the political agenda.  It was a small industry, widely 
dispersed around the country and lacking in organised political representation, and although some 
fishing-port constituencies did return knowledgeable and able Members of Parliament they came 
from across the party political spectrum and rarely acted in concert.
42
  Yet fishing did matter.  Firstly, 
it was a major employer in parts of the country where alternative employment was at best scarce, at 
a time when the experience of mass unemployment was fresh in policymakers’ minds.  Secondly, it 
was strategically important, as a provider of food and as a source of vessels and highly skilled labour 
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for the Royal Navy to draw upon in wartime.  Finally, the activities of fishing vessels in the waters of 
other states gave it an international dimension absent from other industries of comparable size.  
From 1948 onwards, the industry began to assume greater prominence in the minds of politicians, as 
the problems of the 1930s re-emerged in more virulent form, and were joined by new issues thrown 
up by the changed geopolitical climate.  
 The Duncan Commission had highlighted inefficiencies in the supply chain, an aged fishing 
fleet and overproduction.  The first of these was in abeyance, since wartime distribution 
arrangements remained in force, but the second had been worsened by the war because many of 
the newest vessels had been lost on naval service.  The fleet had already begun to expand again, 
however, as the Admiralty began to demobilise vessels and pass them back to their owners, a 
process which had begun as early as 1943 and ensured that the major east coast ports were 
functioning again by the time the war in Europe ended.  Some firms also went on a building spree, 
such as Hull-based Kingston Steam Trawling, which embarked upon a programme of updating its 
fleet by selling off old vessels and purchasing new tonnage.
43
  Between 1945 and 1948 the numbers 
of trawlers active at Hull rose from 99 to 149, at Grimsby from 168 to 254 and at Fleetwood from 31 
to 127, although there was a small drop at Lowestoft, from 66 to 62.
44
  The pre-war pattern, of near-
and middle-water vessels disp rsed around a variety of ports whilst the Humber and Fleetwood 
dominated the distant-water sector, quickly re-emerged, as the figures in Table 2 show. 
 During 1949 alone, 32 new distant-water trawlers came into operation.  Many of these were 
deployed on the northern grounds, which had been little exploited for six years and now yielded 
very high catches, and they also made slightly longer trips than before the war.
45
  Accordingly, by 
late 1946 some on the distributive side of the industry were already voicing concerns about a 
recurrence of the overproduction problem.
46
  Total fish supplies in 1947-9 were over the million-ton 
mark, as opposed to 800,000 before the war, primarily because of the resurgence of distant-water 
fishing.  Moreover, costs were rising again.  Kingston Steam Trawling noted in 1947 that the cost of 
new vessels had risen from £83,000 to £99,000, and by 1949 they had reached £125,000.
47
  Labour 
costs were rising, the coal shortages of 1947-8 drove up the fuel bill, and across the industry there 
was a ‘persistent increase in prices of stores and supplies.’
48
  This began to squeeze the incomes of 
trawler firms, especially those deploying near- and middle-water vessels on the North Sea grounds 
where, even by late 1946, signs of overfishing were re-emerging.  Yields began to drop off after a 
post-war high, and much of the catch was small and of low value.
49
  Moreover, the pre-war import 
controls had not been reinstated, although a ten per cent ad valorum duty was in force, and imports 
were well above their pre-war levels.  Britain imported 6,029,808cwt of fish in 1947 and 4,997,366 
the following year, as opposed to a 1938 figure of 3,558,000.
50
 
 All of this could have spelled a rapid return to the depression of the 1930s, but two factors 
stabilised the situation for the time being.  Firstly, the general economic climate of the late 1940s 
helped to shore up demand.  Substitute foodstuffs, especially poultry and red meat, were still 
rationed, and indeed the meat ration was cut to below wartime levels in 1946.  Moreover, although 
fish had not been rationed, shortages had served to limit consumption during the war.  For both of 
these reasons there was sufficient demand from consumers to absorb the increase in supplies in the 
immediate post-war years.
51
  Meanwhile, for the time being much of the wartime distribution 
structure remained in place.  Price controls continued, as did flat-rate transport and the system of 
merchants’ allocations.  This was slightly modified in 1947 and allocations were granted to some 
new entrants, drawing protests from existing merchants whose allocations would be encroached 
upon.  During 1947-8, too, the zoning scheme was amended and some of the controls on which 
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inland wholesalers port merchants could supply were withdrawn.
52
  These were only slight 
relaxations, however, and the wartime distribution scheme remained essentially intact.   
 By 1948 the climate was changing.  Controls, which were felt to have outlived their 
usefulness, were beginning to be removed in various sectors of the economy, culminating in Harold 
Wilson’s ‘bonfire of the controls’ at the Board of Trade.
53
  The government’s attitude towards 
sectors such as fishing was becoming clearer too.  Minister of Food John Strachey explained to Hull 
merchants in 1947 that it intended ‘to create open competition in trades which could not be 
nationalised in order to safeguard the public against exploitation.’
54
  Such thinking underlay a 
broader attack on monopolies and restrictive practices.
55
  All of this pointed in the direction of 
decontrol in the fish trades, and during 1948 pressure for this began to build up, especially from the 
BTF.
56
  Consideration was given to a staged process, controls on retail prices remaining temporarily 
whilst those on prices further up the supply chain were removed, but merchants opposed this on the 
grounds that it would create chaos and encourage the black market, an argument the government 
evidently accepted.
57
  The tide was now flowing in the direction of complete decontrol, and during 
1948-9 expectation built up that ‘controls would be off altogether.’
58
 
 As decontrol came into view the first signs of serious trouble began to emerge.  The first 
issue was the connected problems of overfishing and fishery limits.  Neither was new, but the latter 
was beginning to assume a more intractable form, and bore especially hard on the distant-water 
fleet.  Britain had signed an international convention on overfishing in the North Sea in 1946, in an 
attempt to prevent a recurrence of pre-war overfishing, and two years later the White Fish and 
Herring Industries Act of 1948
59
 gave the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries the power to impose a 
licensing scheme on vessels working the North Sea grounds.  The convention did not come into force 
until 1954, however, and even then it was largely ineffectual.
60
  In any case, British attempts to 
combat overfishing aimed at securing multilateral agreements controlling fishing effort on the High 
Seas, whereas by this time, in the wake of President Truman’s 1945 proclamation on the United 
States’ right to control the resources of the continental shelf, others were more focused on 
unilateral extensions of fishery limits.
61
  Iceland posed a particular problem in this respect.  Having 
gained independence from Denmark in 1944, in 1949 the Icelandic government gave two years’ 
notice of intention to abrogate the 1901 Anglo-Danish treaty which fixed Iceland’s territorial waters 
at three miles and allowed fishing right up to that limit.
62
  British trawlers also faced increasing 
restrictions on their activities off the coasts of Norway and the USSR, about which the British 
government could do little.
63
   
Nor could much be done about the catching sector’s costs.  For much of 1948 fish sold in the 
shops at or near to the controlled maximum price,
64
 but the rising cost of catching, especially in near 
waters, meant that this was no longer enough to return a profit.  Table 3 presents the results of a 
Ministry of Food investigation of the costs and revenues of various trawlers between 1946 and 1949. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
As Table 3 shows, generally healthy profits in 1946-7 dwindled rapidly until by 1948-9 most near- 
and middle-water vessels were making serious losses.  Nationally, of 837 such vessels, no fewer than 
637 had been built before 1921.  Many were worn out and expensive to maintain, and as coal 
burners they were vulnerable to the general increase in fuel costs.  They also offered dismal 
accommodation and working conditions, which were held to deter young men from entering the 
industry at a time of full employment.
65
  There was little hope of replacing them in the foreseeable 
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future.  To tide them over, the Ministry of Food began paying a subsidy of ten pence per stone on 
fish landed from near- and middle-water grounds from November 1948, joining an international 
trend towards subsidising fishing which had accelerated between the wars but which Britain had not 
joined.
66
  This was just about sufficient to restore profitability, but few can have been under any 
illusions that it would resolve the industry’s difficulties. 
 An already precarious situation took a sharp turn for the worse a year later, when 
predictions of a renewed overproduction problem were suddenly vindicated, and the sellers’ market 
of the immediate post-war years came to an abrupt halt.  As the general food shortages abated and 
rationing, especially of meat, was eased, consumers looked upon fish with increasing disfavour and 
consumption began to fall.
67
  Price controls had encouraged catchers to aim for quantity rather than 
quality, and much distant-water fish, especially, was stale.  This in turn dragged down the price of 
better quality fish.
68
  As The Economist put it, fish embodied ‘all the least attractive features of 
austerity,’ and consumers were ‘sick, tired and fed up’ with it.
69
  Wholesale prices suddenly 
collapsed in November 1949.  A year earlier, a stone of cod at Grimsby had sold for 6s 6d, but this 
now fell to 3s 7d.  Nationally, cod prices fell from 5s 10d per stone to 3s 7d.
70
  This plunged the near- 
and middle-water sectors back into crisis, and the distant-water fleet into ‘crippling’ losses.
71
  It was 
apparent to all concerned that there was no easy solution, and that the 1948 subsidy scheme, which 
had helped to hold the line up to this point, would not prevent the situation worsening.  Equally, 
however, it was widely accepted by now that controls were part of the problem.  Not only did they 
encourage catchers to prioritise quantity over quality, but by assigning quota to each merchant they 
destroyed competition and removed any incentive to improve efficiency.  In short, ‘trade channels 
became stereotyped.’
72
  This hastened the move towards decontrol, in the hope that it would 
encourage catchers to land better quality and thus more valuable fish, which should help to restore 
profitability.
73
   
 Decontrol came on Saturday 15 April 1950.  At the same time, the Ministry of Food subsidy 
to near- and middle-water catchers ended, and also the flat rate transport scheme and the 
remaining licensing restrictions on wholesalers, the latter against the advice of the trade, which was 
well aware that the wholesaling business remained all too easy for the unscrupulous and unsuitable 
to enter.
74
  The result was chaos.  The number of wholesale merchants on the fish market in Hull 
went up from 400 to 600 literally overnight, and similar increases occurred at other ports.  Amid 
‘frenzied bidding’ at the auctions, prices rocketed.  Two days later, on the Monday, this was ‘sharply 
corrected.’
75
  Wholesalers at the inland markets refused to purchase fish at such prices, and 
consumer resistance also emerged.  As Barbara Castle put it in the House of Commons a fortnight 
later, ‘the Housewife is becoming tired of these conspiracies against her purse.’
76
  Demand ebbed 
away, and the spike in prices gave way to a renewed fall.  The price of distant-water fish dropped 
from an average of 4s 6d per stone in the week ending 22 April 1950 to 3s 1d by 13 May, and 
distant-water trawlers’ average earnings dwindled from £173 per day at sea to just £115, against an 
estimated cost of £200 per day to keep a big trawler at sea.  Once again, plummeting prices for 
distant-water fish served to drag down prices across the board.
77
   
 In the face of such losses, owners began tying up their vessels.  Thirty-nine trawlers were 
laid up at Grimsby by the end of April, and eighteen at Lowestoft a fortnight later.
78
  Nationally, by 
the last week of May, 170 of the estimated national fleet of 1,142 trawlers were laid up.  The 
position was especially serious at Milford Haven, where nearly a third of the fleet lay idle, but 
Aberdeen, Grimsby, Fleetwood and Hull had also been badly hit.
79
  At a stormy meeting on 18 May, 
the BTF decided against ordering a complete lay-up of its members’ vessels, mainly because such a 
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move would cost the industry dear in terms of goodwill,
80
 but the position remained highly unstable, 
and on 19 June Federation President Jack Croft Baker again reported to the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries that he had ‘had great difficulty in restraining the meeting from deciding to lay up all 
trawlers’ forthwith.
81
  Croft Baker may have been exaggerating, and certainly some within the 
Ministry felt that a ‘complete stoppage’ was unlikely, not least because the BTF did not speak for the 
whole sector.
82
  Hull trawler owners had left the Federation before the war and only rejoined in 
1950, but thereafter all were members, whereas in early 1951 only 36 of the 113 trawlers at 
Lowestoft were covered.
83
  Nor did the BTF cover Scotland, whose catchers were represented by the 
Scottish Trawlers’ Federation.  BTF members or not, however, trawlers were losing money and 
increasing numbers were being laid up, and whilst a complete stoppage was unlikely it remained an 
alarming possibility. 
 How serious would such a stoppage have been?  The first result would have been to cut 
much of the nation’s fish supply off, almost literally overnight.  Given that in 1949 the deep-sea 
trawler fleet landed 90 per cent of the British catch, if only half of the fleet had tied up the effect on 
supplies would have been profound.
84
  There would doubtless have been a surge in imports to 
compensate, which would have helped to support processors and distributors but would have 
depressed the catchers’ position further.  Nor would it have been sufficient to prevent prices 
soaring.  Even though wholesale prices had plummeted this had not yet been reflected in the shops, 
where fish continued to sell at around its former control prices, and there was now nothing to 
prevent it rising further.  This in turn could lead to a demand for the reintroduction of price controls, 
something the government was keen to avoid.
85
  Certainly, shortages and high prices would have 
been unpopular.  It is telling that two years later the British Housewives’ League and Cheap Food 
League, along with The People newspaper, mounted a major campaign against renewed landing 
restrictions by distant-water trawling firms.
86
  What the government and civil servants professed to 
fear most, however, was unemployment.  By late May 3,500 men were already out of work and 
thousands more would follow in the event of a mass lay-up, not only among fishermen themselves, 
but in ancillary industries such as trawler maintenance and supplies, and in processing firms starved 
of fish.
87
  This would have caused severe hardship in the fishing ports, where alternative 
employment was not easily found, and civil disturbances could follow.
88
   
 One thing that was certain was that the crisis was becoming an increasing embarrassment to 
the government.  Conservative MPs such as Richard Law had already used it to mock Labour’s ‘claim 
to have provided full employment,’ and similar sentiments were being voiced behind closed doors.
89
  
For all of these reasons, even though it affected a small and dispersed industry, the crisis was 
greeted with some alarm.  As the Fisheries Secretary at the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
Peter Dunn, put it, ‘the situation is deteriorating so rapidly and is likely to become [so] acutely 





The deep-sea fishing industry in the 1940s was no less fragmented, fractious and difficult to 
coordinate than it had been between the wars.   The distant-water trawling sector, relatively small 
and concentrated in a few ports, did manage to develop a scheme to combat overproduction and 
shore up prices, but even here agreement from all players was impossible to secure.  For the 
industry as a whole the attitude of government, shared by civil servants in all of the relevant 
Ministries, was once again that it was incapable of resolving its own problems and required decisive 
intervention. 
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The first reaction of almost the entire catching sector, and the one thing on which they all 
agreed, was to blame the crisis on imports, pre-war restrictions on which had not been re-imposed.  
As early as June 1946 a drop in wholesale prices had led trawler crews or officers at Hull, Grimsby, 
Aberdeen, North Shields and Lowestoft, who were paid partly by share of profits, to refuse to put to 
sea.
91
  Crews blamed imports, a cry taken up by trawler owners, who complained that the 
government would do nothing to restrict them despite the ‘tremendous harm’ being done to the 
domestic industry.
92
  Agitation became fiercer during 1948 and reached a crescendo in 1949-50 as 
their financial position crumbled.  In May 1950 the Lowestoft Fishing Vessel Owners Association sent 
a telegram to the Ministry and local MPs stating that their situation was ‘becoming critical mainly 
due to foreign imports,’ and stressing the need for ‘immediate government action to prevent 
collapse and general unemployment.’
93
  This was followed a fortnight later by a deputation from the 
BTF, which demanded both a subsidy to see the industry through the immediate crisis, and 
restriction of imports to 1938 levels.
94
  Trawler owners at all major ports were agreed that, without 
import restrictions, their future looked bleak. 
 If the trawler owners and crews had nailed their colours to the protectionist mast, however, 
others were not so sure.  Some wholesalers felt that the lack of import restrictions was unfair to the 
domestic fleet, and in Lowestoft the merchants broadly supported the local trawler firms upon 
whose supplies they depended.  On the Humber, however, trawler owners’ proposals that 
wholesalers should refrain from buying fish landed by foreign vessels met with support only from 
Grimsby merchants on condition that their counterparts in Hull agreed to do likewise.  This, after 
some debate, they did not agree to, mainly because many of them were selling fish landed by 
foreign vessels, which continued to come to British ports despite facing hostility and sometimes 
obstruction from shoreside workers and trawlermen.
95
  Moreover, wartime cooperation between 
catchers and merchants was starting to revert to the antagonism of the 1930s.  In the largest port, 
Hull, some trawler owners, via their interests in the local ice-manufacturing firm, attempted to 
secure a merchants’ licence and allocation, and thus enter the distributive side of the industry, 
something the established wholesalers were keen to resist.
96
  At least one scheme to improve the 
quality and marketing of fish at the port had already collapsed due to lack of cooperation.
97
  The 
climate of mutual suspicion and occasional recriminations between catchers and distributors did not 
make the industry any easier to deal with, and nor did the fact that the distant-water sector’s 
problems were bound up with the international political and economic situation. 
 The distant-water sector, though, at least retained its longstanding advantage of being small, 
concentrated and cohesive, and this was the one part of the industry that managed a partial solution 
to its difficulties.  From the late 1940s owners had recognised that the overproduction problem 
1930s was likely to recur at some point, and began working on a plan to restrict catching capacity 
and limit landings from northern waters.  By March 1950 distant-water firms at Hull and Grimsby 
had prepared a draft scheme.
98
  Negotiations were hastened by the crisis then reaching its height, 
and the scheme was signed by most distant-water firms on the Humber in July that year.  Even here 
agreement was not universal, however, for firms representing eleven per cent of the two ports’ 
distant-water capacity declined to join what was by then termed the Distant Water Vessels’ 
Development Scheme.
99
  Moreover, the only other significant distant-water port, Fleetwood, had 
not been consulted and was presented with it as a fait accompli, which the Humber firms declined to 
modify to accommodate the Lancashire port’s circumstances.
100
  This was done later, however, when 
a revised Development Scheme was worked up in less haste, and within a few years it embraced the 
entire distant-water sector in England, although the few distant-water vessels in Scotland remained 
Page 14 of 29






























































For Peer Review Only
outside it.
101
  It allowed for the lay-up of up to 25 per cent of capacity on a seasonal basis, 
restrictions on the building and modification of distant-water trawlers, and a system of vessel quotas 
to prevent excessive landings.
102
 
 The Development Scheme did not immediately restore the distant-water sector to profit, 
and investigations in 1952 and 1953 suggested that it was still losing money.
103
  Nevertheless, 
owners were confident that in the longer term it would solve their problems, and it does appear to 
have brought a measure of much-needed stability.
104
  Yet the distant-water sector, although it 
contributed more than two-thirds of British white fish landings,
105
 was but one part of the catching 
sector.  Resolving the immediate and longer-term problems afflicting dozens of smaller firms that 
made up the near- and middle-water sectors, curing the inefficiencies in the supply chain and 
creating some order out of the highly fragmented industry as a whole were tasks of a different order 
of magnitude.  They were tasks that, in the opinion of many in government and some in the industry 
itself, required decisive intervention from outside.
106
   
 The task of formulating a plan to intervene fell primarily to civil servants in the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, who greeted the crisis with some alarm, but also with exasperation.  As 
one remarked, at decontrol the industry had ‘once again demonstrated its utter irresponsibility and 
absence of discipline.’
107
  Nevertheless, they had to fight on two fronts.  Firstly, urgent action was 
needed to stem the catchers’ losses and halt the lay-ups, and secondly, they needed to formulate a 
plan to put the industry back on its feet in the longer term.   
 The question of how to stave off collapse in the catching sector was debated intensely 
during early 1950.  Calls for import restrictions were given short shrift.  At an interdepartmental 
conference in May 1950 representatives from various departments pointed out that an industry 
which catered for 85 per cent of the home market could not, prima facie, be considered threatened 
by imports, and that they were in any case declining.  Indeed, as a representative of the Board of 
Trade commented, imports had ‘remarkably little to do with the matter.’  Instead, criticism was 
levelled at the British industry for waxing fat in the sellers’ market of the immediate post-war years 
and failing to address inefficiencies highlighted by the Duncan Commission, whose report was now 
fourteen years old.  In short, most departments felt that the problems lay at home, and that 
although import restrictions might provide a little short-term relief, they were not the panacea the 
trawler owners seemed to think.
108
 
 In any case, the question of protection opened up wider issues of Britain’s international 
situation.  In particular, any attempt to restrict imports would have hurt Iceland badly.  Fish and its 
products accounted for around 90 per cent of Icelandic exports, of which about a third went to 
Britain.
109
  Trawler owners were well aware of this, which is why they urged government to use the 
threat of restrictions to deter Iceland from extending her fishery limits.  Yet this ignored more 
fundamental geopolitical difficulties.  Iceland was crucial to the Atlantic Alliance and becoming more 
so as the Cold War began to take shape, and overlaying everything was the possibility that Iceland 
could throw in its lot with the Communist bloc, with serious implications for the position of the 
nascent North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in the northern seas.  This was why ultimately, despite 
the aggressive attitude of the industry and some in the civil service, especially Peter Dunn, who felt 
the Icelanders were ‘wholly unreliable as friends,’ the Foreign Office’s conciliatory view prevailed 
and Iceland was treated with caution.
110
 
 Moreover, the international economic climate was shifting fast, away from the 
protectionism of the 1930s and towards a more liberal, free-trade order.  The United States was at 
the forefront of liberalisation, and the United Kingdom, beset by post-war economic difficulties, had 
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little choice but to acquiesce, even though some within the Labour government were unhappy about 
it.
111
  Among the aims of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, founded in 1948, 
was the promotion of free trade through reduction of tariff barriers and import controls, whilst the 
year before Britain had been one of the founding signatories of the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs.  Its impact was initially small, but it did make imposing new restrictions politically 
difficult.
112
  In this climate, restricting fish imports, which would hurt not only Iceland but also 
Norway and Denmark, and to a lesser extent Belgium and the Netherlands, would create a 
‘deplorable impression.’
113
  It would upset much of Europe and the United States, and undermine 
the UK’s wider policy on international trade.  The Foreign Office also felt that it risked sparking off a 
trade war, with potentially even more harmful consequences.
114
  For both of these reasons, although 
consideration was given behind the scenes to restricting imports, and at one stage the possibility 
was even discussed with the OEEC,
115
 calls from within the industry and from parliamentary 
protectionists of left and right
116
 could not be allowed to prevail, and solutions to the fishing 
industry’s crisis had to be sought at home. 
 If reviving import restrictions was politically impossible, and there was no prospect of a 
resurgence of demand to push up prices, the only short-term option open was to subsidise the 
industry until times improved.
117
   This was hotly debated between departments in the early months 
of 1950.  The Treasury held out against a subsidy, arguing that the need for it was unproven.  No 
other department took quite this line, but objections from the Ministry of Food and Board of Trade, 
among others, were founded on the belief that an open-ended subsidy would simply perpetuate the 
fisheries’ problems, and that any financial assistance would have to come with conditions, and an 
acceptance of the need for restructuring.
118
  In fact, even those who advocated a subsidy, such as 
officials from MAF, were agreed that ‘some amount of blood-letting was necessary,’ but felt that the 
alternative was the collapse of much of the industry.
119
  They also pointed out that fish was in 
competition with foods whose production was far more heavily subsidised, and that fishing had 
received little protection from rising costs and subsidised foreign competition.  Moreover, although 
representatives from the Ministry of Labour had argued that government money would be better 
spent on creating alternative employment opportunities in the fishing ports, in practice this would 
be extremely difficult to achieve, so the result of leaving the industry’s fortunes to the market would 
probably be mass unemployment, spiralling retail prices and perhaps unwelcome demands for the 
reimposition of price controls.
120
  Perhaps inevitably, the result was a compromise; a time-limited 
subsidy intended to tide the industry over until longer-term remedies to its ailments could be 
applied from outside. 
 There was little debate over what form this new intervention should take.  Nationalisation of 
the fishing fleet was never considered, despite some calls from backbench Labour MPs.
121
  Fishing, 
unlike the industries that were targeted for nationalisation, was not a basic industry providing 
services to the rest of the economy, and the dozens of firms that comprised it lacked a cadre of 
professional managers to whom its running could be entrusted.
122
  It therefore fitted ill with Labour’s 
generally technocratic approach to nationalisation.  In any case, it was felt that the trawler owners 
would almost certainly refuse to cooperate, which was probably correct, not least because the 
industry tended to gravitate towards the Conservative Party.  Several trawler firms were regular 
donors to it, in some cases along with free-market lobby group the Economic League, and regarded 
the Labour government with suspicion.
123
  Nor was there any realistic prospect of nationalising even 
part of the plethora of small firms that made up the processing and distributive sides of the industry.  
Therefore, for all that some trawling firms suspected otherwise,
124
 the government was determined 
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that as far as possible fishing would be ‘left to the operation of the price mechanism,’ and 
competition would be encouraged to keep prices to the consumer as low as possible.
125
   
The government therefore proceeded on the assumption that fishing would remain within 
the private sector, but that some form of independent body was needed to drive through the 
necessary restructuring.  One obvious option, suggested back in 1947, was to revive the White Fish 
Commission.
126
  Yet this had been a consultative body, and its powers of compulsion were too 
limited for the radical reorganisation now deemed necessary.  The Commission was therefore 
officially abandoned and civil servants spent much of 1949 and early 1950 drawing up a successor 
body with ‘dictatorial powers.’
127
  Like the Development Councils established in certain other 
industries in an attempt to drive through modernisation this was not to be a representative body, 
still less one dominated by Trade Associations representing sectional interests.
128
  Rather, it was to 
be composed of outsiders whose task was to examine and reform the industry as a whole, albeit in 
consultation with an advisory council.
129
  In short, it was an organisation very much in line with the 
Attlee governments’ wider commitment to raising productivity and improving efficiency across the 
private sector, itself a philosophy rooted in the 1930s and consolidated during and after the war.
130
 
 Provisionally called the White Fish Industry Board, the new body was to be charged with the 
‘regulation, reorganisation and development of the white fish industry,’ which was defined very 
broadly to encompass all sea fish other than herring, whose production and distribution was still 
overseen by the Herring Industry Board.  What form this reorganisation would take was to be left to 
the Board to determine after it had investigated the industry.  However, it was to have powers to 
‘secure the merger of trawler owners, processors and wholesale merchants at the ports of landing,’ 
to ‘rationalise the marketing and distribution of fish by operating marketing schemes controlled by 
the Board and not by producers’ and ‘to operate schemes for regulating catches of fish by British 
vessels and dealing with landings of foreign caught fish.’  It would be entitled to trade in fish and 
operate processing plant on its own account, and ‘to acquire and operate fishing vessels and 
processing plants.’  It would also be empowered to register all participants in the industry, and 
endowed with powers of entry and inspection of premises and books to ensure compliance.
131
  All of 
this pointed to fundamental restructuring of the distribution chain, and rationalisation and close 
regulation of catching.  From the outset, however, Ministers quietly assured the BTF that the Board 
would have no power to purchase companies’ shares compulsorily and that its powers to trade in its 
own right would in practice only be deployed where existing marketing arrangements were 
inadequate, which would be in small ports and would thus affect mainly the inshore fisheries.
132
   
 The remainder of the Board’s powers were less potentially controversial, and resembled 
those of the pre-war Commission.  It was to be empowered, subject to ministerial approval, to 
establish national regulations on handling of fish, quality control and minimum price schedules, to 
develop marketing and publicity campaigns to increase demand for the industry’s products, and to 
establish schemes and bodies to promote exports.  It was to act as a coordinating body for publicly-
funded research and development, in collaboration with the Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research, which operated the Torry Research Station at Aberdeen and was in the process of setting 
up a branch laboratory in Hull specialising in fish quality and preservation.
133
  In this respect it fitted 
into the general trend of expansion in government-funded industrial research in the late 1940s.
134
  
Finally, the Board was to act as the conduit for government money flowing to the industry.  It would 
provide grants for training of fishermen and shore-based workers, and it would administer a system 
of government-funded grants and loans for modernisation and replacement of shore establishments 
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and fishing vessels.  All of this would be funded partly by the Treasury, and partly by a levy of a 
penny per stone on all white fish, deducted at the point of first sale.
135
 
 The process culminated in Clement Attlee’s statement to the House of Commons on 4 July 
1950, in which he remarked that: 
 
The difficulties of the white fish industry are basic, complex, and of long standing. There 
is, therefore, no simple solution to them. The view has often been expressed in this 
House that their difficulties are not likely to be overcome by the industry itself. The 
Government agree with this view and have decided to promote legislation to set up an 
Authority with adequate powers to regulate, re-organise and develop the white fish 
industry. 
 
By this time the Board had been rechristened the White Fish Authority.  Its precise powers and 
functions were still being worked out and would not be made public for some months, until 
legislation had been prepared.  Nevertheless, it was obviously expected to drive through changes at 
all levels of the industry.  As an interim measure the Prime Minister also announced an immediate 
subsidy scheme, in effect a continuation of the Ministry of Food subsidies from 1948, which would 
‘secure improvement in the fishing ports meantime and until the White Fish Authority is able to 
apply long term remedies.’
136
  This was given effect in the Sea Fish Industry Act, 1951.
137
 
 By now the distant-water sector had pinned its faith on its own Distant Water Development 
Scheme, and although it could not avoid being brought within the Authority’s remit it was exempted 
from the subsidies.
138
  The middle- and near-water sectors, with their outdated fleets and track 
record of unprofitability and stagnation, were more welcoming.  F.E. Catchpole, chairman of the 
Lowestoft Fishing Vessel Owners’ Association, probably spoke for many when he thanked the 
Authority for visiting the port in April 1951 and stated that ‘already he had the feeling that they were 
getting on with the job and would do it well.’
139
  The distributive side of the trade was more 
cautious, and among the Hull merchants in particular there was concern that the Authority might 
end up being dominated by the trawler owners, and that its ‘object seemed to be in direct 
opposition to ours as they wanted to cut out a lot of dead wood in the Industry.’  These fears were 
reinforced the following year by the omission of a Hull merchant from the White Fish Advisory 
Council, which had first been established to advise the White Fish Commission and was revived to 
serve its successor.
140
  Moreover, wholesale merchants nationally felt that the levy to fund it fell 
unduly heavily upon them, which coloured their view of the Authority from the start.
141
  In 
Parliamentary circles, with the exception of some right-wing Conservative MPs who thought it was a 
vehicle for nationalisation by the back door, and some on the left of the Labour Party who thought it 




 With the continuation of subsidies and the promise of fundamental reform from the White 
Fish Authority, the sense of crisis quickly abated during the summer of 1950.  Most of the laid-up 
trawlers were sent back to sea, although some of the oldest went instead to the breakers’ yard, 
leaving the number of near- and middle-water vessels in 1951 slightly lower than in 1949.
143
  The 
demand for import controls also faded, although it did not disappear entirely.
144
  The situation 
improved further that winter, from the catchers’ point of view at least, when bad weather and 
consequent shortages of supplies, coupled with another cut in the meat ration, sent prices soaring.  
This led to renewed calls for the reimposition of price controls, which were taken seriously enough 
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to be considered behind the scenes.
145
  However, the distant-water owners responded by 
suspending the Distant Water Development Scheme and sending all of their vessels to sea, which 
served to bring prices back down over the next couple of months.
146
  Once again, the sense of crisis 
faded into the distance. 
 
Legacy and Conclusions 
The period between 1945 and 1951 represented a watershed in relationships between government 
and the fisheries.  Historically, although sections of the industry had long accepted that government 
had a role to play in securing access to key fishing grounds and policing the behaviour of their users, 
and at times had advocated greater government action on these fronts, it had generally been very 
hostile to government ‘interference’ in how participants conducted their businesses.  However, this 
hostility abated in the depressed circumstances of the 1930s, and the crisis after 1945 fostered a 
sufficiently strong consensus that reform was needed to quiet most potential opposition to 
governmental interference in a business that had generally preferred to be left well alone. 
 On the industry’s side, the Distant Water Development Scheme remained in force until it 
was rendered superfluous by Britain’s accession to the European Economic Community in 1973.  At 
this point it was replaced by th  Fish Producers’ Organisation (FPO).  Producer Organisations, under 
European rules, are voluntary associations of catchers set up to coordinate production and 
marketing of fish and agricultural products.
147
  The FPO was the first such organisation in Britain.
148
  
Initially it was composed primarily of Humber distant-water trawler firms.  By then, however, the 
threat to their main fishing grounds that was already apparent in 1949-50 had become critical, and 
three years later Icelandic fishing grounds were closed altogether to British trawlers, tipping the 
distant-water sector into terminal decline.
149
  The FPO exists to this day, although its membership 
has altered greatly with the disappearance of most of the firms that founded it.   The distant-water 
sector managed to develop reasonably effective responses to the problem of overcapacity in the 
early 1930s and again in 1950, but never to resolve the problem of access to its own resource base, 
which was tangentially related but ultimately much more serious.   
 Between the wars and after 1945, the near- and middle-water sectors, and the distributive 
side of the industry, were far less capable of acting in concert, and were vulnerable to disastrous 
losses when the market moved against them.  It was the threat of their collapse that provided the 
impetus for decisive intervention.  The interventions of the 1930s were very much in line with those 
adopted in other struggling industries and aimed at boosting demand and encouraging industrial 
self-organisation rather than intervening in a very direct manner.  In the case of the deep-sea 
fisheries, however, the White Fish Commission, came too late to have any significant effect before 
war intervened, if indeed it ever could, which given its limited powers is doubtful.   Elements of it 
resurfaced in 1950, however, in the form of the White Fish Authority, which exemplified a more 
aggressive form of intervention to reorganise struggling industries not slated for nationalisation.
150
  
The Authority commenced its work formally in July 1951 under the chairmanship of Admiral Sir 
Robert Burnett.  Its powers were formidable, yet its first annual report, in spring 1952, stated that it 
had considered and rejected the possibility of drawing up a comprehensive plan for the industry.
151
  
The radical reorganisation its founders had envisaged never happened, although in later years it did 
become a major force in fisheries research and development both in Britain and overseas, in 
addition to mounting large-scale promotional campaigns.
152
  In 1981 it was merged with the Herring 
Industry Board, whose raison d'être had disappeared with the collapse of the herring fisheries, to 
create the Sea Fish Industry Authority.  Seafish, as it is now known, was shorn of many of its 
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 For all the debate over reorganisation, however, the subsidies which were quietly and 
uncontroversially introduced in 1948, and then continued under the 1951 Act, proved to be the most 
important legacy of the crisis.  Britain belatedly joined other countries in subsidising its fisheries, and 
has done so ever since.  Subsidies were intended to be temporary, to continue only until the White 
Fish Authority had reorganised the industry to the point where it could stand on its own feet.  Yet 
no-one specified how long this was expected to take, and it receded further and further into the 
distance.  The subsidy was essential to the economics of many of the near- and middle-water 
vessels, some of whose owners immediately began to press for more.
154
  Subsidies thus continued 
on a nominally time-limited basis throughout the 1950s, and were confirmed for a further ten years 
by a major enquiry chaired by Sir Alexander Fleck, which reported in 1961.  By this time the distant-
water fleet had also begun to lose money again, and was duly included.
155
  This time, though, a 
definite date was set by which it was expected the industry should be able to operate without 
subsidy.  The Fleck Committee’s recommendation, put into effect by Act of Parliament the following 
year, was that subsidies would taper away over ten years.
156
  The timescale was later lengthened by 
two years, but operating subsidies did indeed cease in July 1973, although the inshore fleet 
remained subsidised and grants for modernisation, new building and training in the deep sea fleet 
continued.
157
  However, the oil crisis and subsequent inflation of the early 1970s, coupled with loss 
of access to distant-water grounds and the protracted process of drawing up the European Common 
Fisheries Policy, hit the industry hard, and operating subsidies were reintroduced in 1975.
158
  Since 
then, in Britain as elsewhere, they have ‘settled in’ and become politically extremely difficult to 
remove, and they remain to the present day.
159
   
 The period between 1945 and 1951, then, saw far-reaching changes across the deep-sea 
fishing industry, and the beginnings of some key aspects of modern fisheries policy.  Some of this 
was occasioned by stock depletion and disputes over access to fishing grounds which are the best 
known aspects of the industry’s twentieth-century history. Yet the question of the industry’s 
organisation was closely linked with these, and for much of the twentieth century was equally 
important.  
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